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Digging in Terror Management Theory:
To Use or Lose the Symbolic Self?
Arnaud Wisman
University of Kent
Without the meditative background that is criticism,
works become isolated gestures, historical accidents,
soon forgotten.
Milan Kundera
“I think therefore I am” is the statement of an intellec-
tual who underrates toothaches.
Milan Kundera
Terror Management Theory (TMT) is a well-
established theory that has provided major and fre-
quent contributions to the field of psychology and be-
yond. An impressive number of studies have provided
support for a variety of TMT hypotheses (Pyszczynski,
Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003), and TMT is one of the
few theories that can provide feasible explanations for
a wide range of human phenomena, including taboos
surrounding the human body (Goldenberg,
Pyszczynski, Johnson, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000),
people’s desire for offspring (Wisman & Goldenberg,
2005), rejection and avoidance of outgroup members
(e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Ochsman & Mathy,
1996), and polarization of political views in the after-
math of dramatic historical events such as 9/11
(Pyszczynski et al., 2003). For these reasons, and
more, TMT merits serious consideration, open exami-
nation, and continuous exploration.
Alongside of TMT’s strength and breath, however,
are some reasons to believe that the theory may not be
complete. The theory focuses primarily on the sym-
bolic mechanisms (cultural standards and self-esteem)
that individuals use to cope with existential anxiety. In
this article, I raise the possibility that individuals may
also use presymbolic mechanisms to cope with this
anxiety. Presymbolic mechanisms include phenomena
such as flow, sex, secure attachment, and getting lost in
a crowd. They operate, in large part, by reducing objec-
tive self-awareness. These mechanisms are evolu-
tionarily and developmentally more basic than sym-
bolic ones and do not require as great an involvement
of symbolic capacities.
I begin by discussing the symbolic buffer that is at
the core of TMT. Then, I describe some presymbolic
mechanisms and present some evidence that they may
also be useful in buffering existential concerns. After
that, I discuss some factors that may determine when
individuals use presymbolic mechanisms, rather than
symbolic ones, to manage their existential concerns.
Finally, I offer some speculations on the nature of opti-
mal existential regulation.
Proximal and Distal Defenses in TMT
According to TMT, humans are unique in the ani-
mal world in knowing that they are going to die. Like
other animals, though, human have an undeniable in-
stinct to stay alive. Together, these features present hu-
mans with a unique and seemingly unsolvable prob-
lem. Humans are biologically motivated to stay alive,
but they know that they cannot stay alive—at least not
permanently. There are only two logical solutions to
this problem: (a) eliminate the instinct to stay alive or
(b) eliminate death. Although neither solution is possi-
ble in the literal sense, individuals cope with this exis-
tential problem by eliminating the problem of death
awareness.
It has been suggested (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, &
Solomon, 1999) that individuals manage the problem
of death awareness through two types of defenses. In
the proximal defense, individuals attempt to suppress
thoughts of their death or else distract themselves from
such thoughts. They may also engage in pseudological
denials of vulnerability and the relevance of death con-
cerns (e.g., “I am young. Why would I die?”). Proximal
defenses work by removing the problem of death from
consciousness. These defenses do nothing, however, to
solve the problem. The individual will still die, and
death related thoughts will still be accessible at the un-
conscious level. So, at best, the proximal defenses pro-
vide only partial and temporary relief.
With distal defenses, individuals make use of their
symbolic abilities. According to TMT, individuals de-
velop their own individualized version of the standards
and values espoused in their culture (i.e., their individ-
ualized worldview) and then try to live in accordance
with those standards and values. If they are able to do
so, then they attain high self-esteem that, in turn, buff-
ers them for the fear of death. By living in accordance
with their individualized cultural worldview, individu-
als can come to believe that some important aspect of
themselves (e.g., soul, children, values) will live on af-
ter the death of their biological body. Thus, unlike the
proximal defenses, the distal one allows individuals to
Psychological Inquiry
2006, Vol. 17, No. 4, 319–327
Copyright © 2006 by



























believe that they can transcend death in some form.
This means that the distal defense can eliminate death
concerns at both the conscious and the unconscious
level.
There is at least one weakness to the distal or sym-
bolic defense. It only works if individuals have abso-
lute faith in their worldview. Worldviews, however, are
relatively arbitrary constructions and there are numer-
ous conflicting worldviews in existence. So, individu-
als may be exposed frequently to threats to their
worldview. If individuals experience any doubt that
their worldview is absolutely valid, then they become
susceptible to existential anxiety. After all, if individu-
als are not living up to the appropriate standards, then
they are not assured of transcending death in some
way.
In sum, TMT suggests that individuals may use dis-
traction and suppression to cope with their existential
concerns on a temporary basis. These proximal de-
fenses do not actually eliminate the problem of death.
So, individuals may resort to the distal defense. In this
way, individuals come to believe that some aspect of
the self will continue after the death of the biological
body. There is an internal logic to TMT and a number
of studies have provided support for its hypotheses.
There are reasons to believe, though, that there may be
more types of defenses than captured in the proxi-
mal–distal distinction.
Presymbolic Defenses
It is interesting to note that animals and young chil-
dren do not seem to suffer from existential concerns. It
is not that they buffer existential anxiety when it arises.
It appears instead that, in the absence of a conceptual
self, the anxiety does not arise in the first place. This
observation raises the possibility that strategies that re-
duce an individual’s awareness of his or her conceptual
or symbolic self might help manage the problem of
death awareness—and not just temporarily.
In his recent book, The Cultural Animal,
Baumeister (2005) noted that humans, like other ani-
mals, have skills that allow them to survive in the phys-
ical and social world. These skills, for the most part,
are rather basic and allow individuals (and other ani-
mals) to eat, reproduce, fight or flee when threatened,
and so on. Baumeister (2005) also noted, though, that
humans are unique in the extent to which they can cre-
ate, maintain, and participate in a created, cultural en-
vironment. This environment grows out of socially
shared information and provides individuals with
goals, ideas, rules, purposes, and meaning structures.
In other words, the cultural environment is largely con-
ceptual. Humans are adept at operating in such a con-
ceptual environment because they evolved as cultural
animals living in a cultural world.
In line with Baumeister’s (2005) distinction be-
tween the physical/social environment and the cultural
environment, I refer to regulative behavior that is not
specific to the cultural world as presymbolic. These be-
haviors include affiliation, eating, drinking, having
sex, and sleeping. Individuals can enact these behav-
iors with little involvement of the symbolic capacities
they need to deal with the cultural world.
I refer to regulative behavior that is specific to the
cultural world as symbolic. These are behaviors that
rely heavily on conceptualization and what might be
called counterfactual knowledge (e.g., goals, stan-
dards, future consequences). For instance, students
may endure days of hard work locked away from the
sunshine by imagining themselves at some future time
getting a Ph.D. and landing a job full of meaningful,
enjoyable work. As I have just shown, TMT empha-
sizes the role of cultural or symbolic processing in the
buffering of existential concerns. It is possible, though,
that individuals may also use strategies in the less con-
ceptual, more physical and social environment to
buffer their existential concerns.
Losing the Self as a Defense
Mechanism
Although some primates show some mirror medi-
ated self-recognition, and as such seem to have a sense
of objective self awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1973;
Lewis 1992), it is extremely unlikely that primates
ponder their own mortality. They seem to lack the cog-
nitive capacities required to entertain thoughts about
their own death. In fact, even humans are happily un-
aware of their own mortality until they reach the age of
approximately 7 years (Florian & Kravetz, 1985).
Thus, to be fully aware of the consequences of life and
death, a necessary condition seems to be what
Sedikides and Skrowonski (1997, 2000, 2003) called a
sense of symbolic self-awareness. These observations
raise the possibility that a loss of self-awareness could
lessen the psychological consequences of mortality sa-
lience. The individual will still die, but he or she will
not be overly worried about this during his or her life.
Consistent with the hypothesis that reductions in
self-awareness can act as a buffer of existential
concerns, several studies have demonstrated a relation
between mortality salience and unpleasant self-
awareness. Various studies have shown that reminders
of mortality promote behaviors that are directed at
avoiding a self-focus (Arndt, Greenberg, Simon,
Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1998; Taubman–Ben-Ari &
Findler, 2005). For instance, participants who wrote
about their death spent significantly less time in front
of a mirror (a classic measurement of self-awareness
developed by Duval & Wicklund, 1972, 1973), com-





























A recent study (Taubman–Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005)
found that eating reduced the effects of reminders of
mortality. More specifically, the results showed that
participants who were asked to taste food did not show
the usual increased defensiveness after reminders of
mortality. By contrast, participants who were not of-
fered food showed more severe judgments of trans-
gressions (a measure of symbolic defense), as com-
pared to a control condition. In short, this study
suggested that reducing a self-focus by activating
presymbolic mechanism (eating) may help to reduce
thoughts about mortality.
Such an outcome would be compatible with a num-
ber of classic studies on obejctive self-awareness. For
example, individuals smoked relatively more when
seated in front of a mirror (Wicklund, 1975). Appar-
ently, the smoking, although life threatening, allows
individuals to escape the negative affect associated
with their objective self-awareness (see for an over-
view, Baumeister, 1991).
In the context of TMT, the results of the studies just
discussed would be attributed to a proximal defense.
Eating, smoking, or avoidance of a mirror do not allow
individuals to manage the problem of death. So, they are
not likely to reduce the unconscious accessibility of
death related thoughts (Arndt, Routledge, Cox, &
Goldenberg, 2005). Contrary to this conclusion,
though, several studieshaveshownthatpresymbolicbe-
haviors that reduce self-awareness also reduce the ac-
cessibilityofdeathrelated thoughts (Taubman–Ben-Ari
& Findler, 2005; Wisman & Koole, 2003; Wisman &
Shrira, 2006). It appears, therefore, that some forms of
presymbolic defense go beyond simple distraction or
suppression. They can contribute to effective coping
with existential concerns.
Another TMT line of research that is relevant in
this context reveals that reminders of mortality can
increase the willingness to engage in risky behaviors
such as reckless driving (Taubman–Ben-Ari, Florian
& Mikulincer, 1999), unsafe sex (Goldenberg, Cox,
Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2002), and un-
healthy food consumption (Ferraro, Shiv, & Bettman,
2005). These kind of risk taking behaviors are also
associated with a loss of self-awareness (Baumeister,
1991). Losing self-awareness can help individuals to
cope with unpleasant self-awareness that the sym-
bolic self can engender. By engaging in presymbolic
behaviors, such as continuous food taking, individu-
als shut down the symbolic self and, as such, regulate
unpleasant self-awareness. For instance, research re-
vealed that binging may function as a mechanism to
avoid identity issues (Wheeler, Adams, & Keating,
2001).
In the context of TMT, such risk taking behaviors
have been explained in terms of self-esteem enhance-
ment. Although the behaviors threaten the individual’s
life, they also allow the individual to live up to the stan-
dards of their culture. However, a number of studies
have shown that individuals sometimes engage in
these risk taking behaviors even when their own be-
liefs or health are at stake (Ferraro et al., 2005;
Taubman–Ben-Ari & Findler, 2005). Such findings
are consistent with the hypothesis that when mortality
is salient but symbolic means to buffer death anxiety
are not accessible, individuals might engage in behav-
iors that lead them to lose symbolic self-awareness.
When individuals are not objectively self-aware, they
are more likely to engage in behaviors that are incon-
sistent with their own attitudes (Milgram, 1974,
Zimbardo, 1973).
It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that both
presymbolic and symbolic terror management mecha-
nism can effectively reduce death-related thoughts,
and that both can do so at the conscious, as well as the
unconscious, levels. Although presymbolic mecha-
nisms involve losing the self, and symbolic mecha-
nisms involve using the self, both accomplish the same
goal. They reduce the accessibility of death related
thoughts.
The Social Roots of Presymbolic
Defenses
Why should presymbolic defenses reduce the ac-
cessibility of death-related thoughts? An answer can
be found in human cultural evolution. In line with
TMT (Pyszczynzki et al., 2003), it can be argued that
humans had to deal with the problem of death before
they developed extensive symbolic solutions to address
the problem. If this argument is correct, then in earlier
stages of cultural development humans relied on
presymbolic structures to manage death awareness.
Moreover, these basic mechanisms may still in place.
Evolution tends to build on the past, rather than cast it
off and start anew. It does not throw out an old brain
system, for example. Rather, evolution modifies and
extends the existing system (Allman, 1999). Similarly,
wings seemed to have evolved out of existing limbs
rather than out of a total new structure. It seems reason-
able to suppose, therefore, that the more recently de-
veloped symbolic solutions to the problem of death
may have their roots in presymbolic structures. If so,
then an examination of these roots may provide insight
into other mechanisms that might buffer existential
concerns.
Humanitie’s ancestors lived the first 90% of their
existence in small, close knit groups (Maryanski &
Turner, 1992; Sahlins, 1972) that were linked to larger
social networks (Van Vugt & Van Lange, 2006). Likely
presymbolic candidates that may have preceded sym-
bolic defenses, therefore, are affiliative strivings
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). From an evolutionary
perspective, belonging to a group confers many impor-
321



























tant advantages. It improved an individual’s ability to
gather food, increased likelihood of mating, and con-
ferred greater protection against threats from the envi-
ronment (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Buss, 1991;
Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). Given the adaptive
benefits associated with belongingness, it seems likely
that vigorous psychological mechanisms would have
evolved to ensure that individuals would form strong
associations between themselves and their social
group, and minimize the danger of becoming isolated
or expelled from the group (Abrams, Marques &
Hogg, 2005; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Mikulincer,
Birnbaum, Woddis, & Nachmias, 2000; Taylor et al.,
2000).
Indeed, numerous studies have demonstrated the
significance of a need to belong in human motivation.
For instance, it has been shown that social exclusion
impairs self-regulation on several tasks (Baumeister,
DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005). Moreover, al-
though some aspects of affiliation might have become
more abstract and symbolic (belonging to a nation),
others seem connected with innate mechanisms (Mac-
Donald & Leary, 2005) and play a major role in coping
with distress (Nachmias, Gunnar, Mangelsdorf,
Parritz, & Buss, 1996; Taylor et al., 2000).
One way in which becoming immersed in a group
can aid in coping is by lowering objective
self-awareness. This has been demonstrated in a wide
range of classic social psychology studies (Diener,
1979; Milgram, 1974, Mullen, 1991, Zimbardo, 1973).
In addition, when individuals become immersed in a
group, they cease comparing their behavior against
their own standards and they feel less concerned about
how others may evaluate their behavior (Mann, New-
ton, & tones, 1982).
It is possible, therefore, that mortality salience
engenders a presymbolic defense related to belong-
ingness and affiliation. From this perspective, it is nat-
ural for individuals who are threatened to seek to hide
in a crowd. In doing so, they also reduce their objective
self-awareness. This, in turn, can reduce their existen-
tial concerns, which can only exist in the presence of a
symbolic self.
If this reasoning is correct, then mortality salience
should increase the desire to lose one’s self in a group
and this, in turn, should reduce the usual effects of
mortality salience (e.g., derogation of an outgroup
member). Wisman and Koole (2003) obtained evi-
dence that this is the case in a series of studies. In these
studies, reminders of mortality induced in participants
a tendency to sit next to and among fellow group mem-
bers, as opposed to sitting alone. Moreover, this was
true even when the increased affiliation meant that par-
ticipants’ worldviews were threatened by the group
with whom they were affiliating, and when affiliating
with the group meant that participants had to attack
their own worldviews. It is difficult to interpret such
findings in terms of a distal symbolic defense (e.g.,
bolster worldview). It appears, instead, that mortality
salience motivated participants to affiliate, and that in
doing so participants lowered their awareness of their
symbolic self.
Further evidence that it was a reduction in
self-awareness that allowed participants to feel com-
fortable affiliating with individuals who held world-
views contrary to their own was obtained by Wisman
and Shrira (2006). They found that, compared to par-
ticipants in the control condition, participants re-
minded of death sought greater physical proximity
with a group of individuals, but had no greater willing-
ness to socialize with a confederate (such as having a
cup of coffee). In other words, the effect of mortality
salience was specific to losing one’s self in the crowd
and not merely affiliating with others. It is also inter-
esting to note that participants who sat with a group of
individuals who held worldviews different from their
own expressed a weaker defense of their worldview. In
other words, affiliation reduced defensiveness follow-
ing mortality salience.
In sum, it appears that a presymbolic mechanism,
such as affiliation, reduced symbolic self-awareness,
which in turn reduced the effects of mortality sa-
lience. This outcome does not seem to be due to dis-
traction or suppression and, unlike the worldview de-
fense, it does not promise some form of immortality.
Rather, individuals who lose themselves in the group
seem to lose their objective self-awareness, and in the
absence of a symbolic self there can be no existential
concerns.
It is important that these findings and theories are
corroborated by a developmental perspective (Bowlby,
1969; Florian & Mikulincer, 1998). Human infants are
not born with a ready-made symbolic solution to the
problem of existential fear. Therefore, it is likely that
when death awareness first awakes in them, human in-
fants have to rely on mechanisms (e.g., safe attach-
ment) that do not require the cognitive capacities that
are associated with symbolic awareness (Bowlby,
1969; Florian & Mikulincer, 1998). These presymbolic
mechanisms may still function to ward off fears, in-
cluding existential ones.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Mikulincer,
Florian and Hirschberger (2003) proposed that close
relationships may form an anxiety-buffer that is func-
tionally distinct from worldview defense. Indeed, nu-
merous studies have shown that secure attachment
figures can function to ward off existential fear
(Mikulincer & Florian, 2000; Mikulincer et al.,
2003). In fact, only insecurely attached individuals
were found to respond to mortality salience by in-
creased worldview defense (Mikulincer & Florian,
2001). By contrast, securely attached individuals
were found to respond to mortality salience by in-





























Taubman–Ben-Ari, Findler, and Mikulincer (2002)
obtained related results. They found that mortality sa-
lience led to more willingness to initiate social interac-
tions, especially among securely attached individuals.
Finally, research has demonstrated that thoughts of
romantic commitment reduce death thought accessi-
bility (Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2002;
Hirschberger, Florian, & Mikulincer, 2003). In sum,
this body of research, along with the Wisman and
Koole (2003) findings, suggest that individuals can
make use of affiliation, a presymbolic mechanism, to
manage the terror that is associated with death aware-
ness.
To Use or Lose the Symbolic Self?
When do individuals use symbolic mechanisms
(e.g., culture, self-esteem) to buffer themselves from
existential concerns, and when to they use presymbolic
defenses? A consideration of the research derived from
objective self-awareness theory (OSA, Duval &
Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982; 1985)1
may shed some light on the conditions that favor one
strategy over the other. According to this theory, when
individuals become aware of themselves as an object
of evaluation, they become more aware of the discrep-
ancies between their actual self and the standards set
for the self. This discrepancy, in turn, arouses negative
affect that motivates individuals either to avoid
self-awareness or reduce the discrepancy.
If the discrepancy is relatively small or if individu-
als feel that they can reduce the discrepancy, then they
attempt to do so. For instance, students may realize that
they did not study enough for their last exam. So, they
may decide to study harder for the next exam. In doing
so, they may be able to reduce the discrepancy between
their actual test performance and their desired perfor-
mance.
If individuals feel that there are unable to reduce the
discrepancy, however, then they may attempt to reduce
self-awareness more directly (Carver, 1975;
Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985; Silvia & Duval, 2001;
Wicklund & Duval, 1971). For instance, students who
do poorly on a test may go out and drink unhealthy
amounts of alcoholic beverages. This activity will not
improve their performance on the next test, but it may
help them avoid the negative feelings aroused by their
poor performance (i.e., the discrepancy between their
desired and actual performance). Indeed, various stud-
ies have illustrated that individuals eat, drink, or use
drugs to reduce their sense of self-awareness (for a
broad overview see Baumeister, 1991).
This research raises the possibility that individuals
with strong, coherent worldviews may attempt to man-
age mortality salience with worldview defense, be-
cause doing so provides them with an unequivocal so-
lution to the problem of death (see Dechesne et al.,
2003). Individuals with weaker, less coherent world-
views, or individuals that believe that they cannot live
up to the standards of their worldview, are left without
a clear way to attain immortality. As a result, they may
attempt to cope by using behaviors that reduce their
objective self-awareness. More generally, bridging
OSA theory and TMT suggests that individuals make
use of symbolic solutions (worldview defense) to re-
duce death thought accessibility when symbolic solu-
tions are accessible and seem sufficient to solve the
problem of death, but they may attempt to lose sym-
bolic self-awareness when symbolic solutions are not
accessible or do not seem sufficient to solve the prob-
lem of death.
Toward an Optimal Existential
Regulation
Both the proximal and the distal defenses suggested
in TMT seem to have their weaknesses. The proximal
defense seems to be temporary and restricted to con-
scious thoughts. Moreover, most of the behaviors (e.g.,
drinking or overeating) that individuals use to distract
themselves from unpleasant thoughts contribute to
nonoptimal functioning. By comparison, the distal de-
fense can eliminate the problem of death, but it is based
on an arbitrary, constructed worldview. These struc-
tures need continuous social validation. Because there
are countless contradicting worldviews, individuals
can never be sure that their belief system is the only
correct one. The insecurity surrounding one’s world-
view could promote defensiveness and outgroup dero-
gation, and even extremism (e.g.,McGregor, Zanna,
Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 2006).
The final problem with distal, symbolic defenses is
that they are abstract. They exist in individual’s heads
and lack a direct touch with reality. The great source of
inspiration for all TMT researchers, Ernest Becker
(1973), acknowledged this problem and noted that
whatever symbolic solution people invent or choose,
those people remain just as mortal as a cockroach or a
peacock.
Is it possible for individuals to develop an existen-
tial defense mechanism that is more effective than ei-
ther the proximal or distal defense? In general, such a
defense would be grounded in the real world, would
not be fragile, would be well connected to the individ-
ual’s genuine values, but would not promote objective
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1Note that this comparison is not to suggest that death awareness
is equal to negative self-awareness, but rather that the strategies that
individuals may use to tackle the awareness of death may resemble
the strategies to reduce self-awareness, as proposed by the OSA the-
ory. For a broader discussion about the relationship between



























self-awareness. Activities such as dance, martial arts,
sports, or religious activities seem like promising can-
didates. These activities allow individuals to lose their
self focus but at the same time to increase their feelings
of self-worth by engaging in behavior that is approved
by the cultural standards or their own set standards
(Leary, 2004). Similarly, affiliative behaviors can be
associated with a reduced focus on the self, as well as
with prosocial behaviors (Joireman & Duell, 2005). It
appears, therefore, that optimal existential regulation
should incorporate some using and some losing of the
symbolic self.
Perhaps the prototype of the use–lose balance is the
flow experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). During
flow, individuals seem to lose themselves and become
completely immersed in activities. They experience in-
tense positive affect, a distortion of the sense of time,
and few off-task thoughts. Flow also quiets the self. In-
dividuals in flow are not aware of themselves as objects
of evaluation.
Flow is more than just the absence of self-awareness,
however. In fact, during flow, individuals are keenly
aware of their activities. Moreover, individuals do not
experience flow during activities that have no meaning
or intrinsic value to them, and flow is associated with a
growth in the self. In short, individuals engaged in flow
are immerged inanactivity that isclose to theirauthentic
self (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). So, flow might come
close to what one may call optimal existential regula-
tion. It balancesaspectsofusingand losing thesymbolic
self. As a result, it is a strong candidate for an effective,
long-term buffer of existential concerns.
This hypothesis is congruent with suggestions by
Martin (1999). He proposed that flow may be a general
moderator of a number of social psychology phenom-
ena, including mortality salience. In fact, he reported
that, in comparison to control conditions, mortality sa-
lience increased outgroup derogation only among par-
ticipants who reported experiencing low levels of flow.
Mortality salience had no effect on individuals high in
flow.
The Individual in Relation
to the Group
I have suggested that getting lost in a crowd may
serve as an effective buffer for existential concerns.
However, as Heidegger (1982) noted, merely follow-
ing the crowd keeps individuals from establishing their
authentic self and allows them to hide from their exis-
tential concerns (Martin, Cambell, & Henry, 2004).
Becker (1973) formulated the problem this way:
Most people play it safe: they choose the beyond of
standard transference objects like their parents; the
boss or the leader; they try to be a good provider or a
solid citizen. In this way they earn their species im-
mortality as an agent of procreation, or collective or
cultural immortality as part of a social group of some
kind. (p. 170)
This not necessarily optimal, though. As noted by
Martin et al. (2004), by adopting widespread cultural
values, individuals may
lose themselves in their daily business and worldly af-
fairs, and avoid the awesome responsibility of having
to define their essence for themselves. They base their
life choices not on personal values but on widely
shared cultural values that, while seeming to be abso-
lute, may not be valid for them as unique individuals.
As a result, these individuals fail to become the unique
individual they are capable of becoming. (p. 434)
Although individuals often seek the crowd to buffer
themselves from the fear of death, it is precisely this
fear that may lead them to separate themselves from
the group (Heidegger, 1982; Martin et al., 2004). Indi-
viduals who have had a near-death experience often
switch their worldviews to a more individuated
worldview and report greater well being (Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 2004). They also experience a sense of liber-
ation, of being able to choose what they really want to
do and are less concerned about the opinion of others
(Martin et al., 2004).
Related findings have been obtained by Cozzolino
Staples, Meyers, and Sambioceti (2005; for a more
elaborated discussion see Cozzolino, this issue). They
distinguished between mortality salience and death re-
flection, and found that the former led highly extrinsic
participants to manifest greed, whereas the latter led
them to manifest intrinsic, unselfish behavior
(Cozollino et al., 2005). This and other studies showed
that reflections upon one’s death may provide the soil
for a more authentic life style. Such a lifestyle seems to
involve a balance of losing the self and using the self,
as well as a balance of hiding in the crowd and being a
unique individual. With this balance, individuals lose
their objective self-awareness and remain true to their
authentic values. As a result, the fear of death, which is
based on a highly accessible symbolic self, cannot take
hold.
Thus, optimal existential coping may involve a con-
sideration of the self in relation to the group. This may
involve some degree of deviation on the individual’s
part. Thus, optimal functioning may come at a price.
As Becker (1973) put it:
It takes strength and courage the average man does not
have and could not even understand. The most terrify-
ing burden of the creature is to be isolated which is
what happens in individuation: one separates himself
out of the herd. This move exposes the person to the





























cause he sticks out so much, has to carry so much in
himself. (p. 171)
Concluding Remarks
The psychological confrontation with death is un-
doubtedly one of the most puzzling and challenging
problems that each individual must face. Because indi-
viduals evolved with an instinct for survival in juxtapo-
sition with the awareness of the recognition of the im-
possibility of their mission, they need to rely on
psychological defenses to shield themselves from exis-
tential anxiety. According to TMT, the belief in some-
thing larger and longer lasting than oneself and the
conviction that what one does is meaningful are all ele-
ments of symbolic structures (worldviews) that func-
tion as shields against the awareness of one’s terrifying
fate. The current perspective recognizes the impor-
tance of symbolic solutions to the problem of death,
but suggests that not all human beings are capable or
willing to construct and maintain beliefs that provide
an illusion of transcendence. For these individuals,
presymbolic mechanisms may provide only a tempo-
rary respite. When used optimally, though, these mech-
anisms can lower objective self-awareness and effec-
tively eliminate death-related thoughts.
I believe that the proposed framework contributes to
TMT in several ways. First of all, the proposed frame-
work synthesizes a wide range of theoretical perspec-
tives into one comprehensive framework of existential
regulation. Second, this framework provides a simpli-
fied model that can account for several anomalies
within TMT. Third, the proposed framework extends
the core logic of TMT. Fourth, the proposed frame-
work provides unique predictions that might be appli-
cable to clinical settings. Finally, a better understand-
ing of the working of alternative strategies and perhaps
more primitive solutions to the problem of death might
elucidate why so many human beings endorse sym-
bolic structures that not only terrorize themselves, but
also constitute a major threat to peaceful coexistence.
Notes
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